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STATUTORY STANDARDS OF CARE IN
PENNSYLVANIA AUTOMOBILE CASES
By THE HONORABLE LEO H. McKAY *

D

OES a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code constitute negligence in Pennsylvania? The answer to this question would appear at first glance to
be simple and obvious-yes. Negligence is the failure to exercise due care
under the circumstances. The standard of due care may be established by
statute or by judicial decision, or, lacking either, by the jury in a given case.
Since the Vehicle Code has prescribed in detail the conduct required of operators of vehicles upon the highway under almost every conceivable traffic situation, it would seem that these statutory mandates would establish the standard
of due care for operators, under the circumstances covered by them, so that
their violation would be negligence. As will be pointed out, however, this
result does not necessarily follow.
I.

NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT

Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of links et al. v.
Currie et al,' the status of violations of the Vehicle Code as acts of negligence
was uncertain. Decisional support was available in support of three distinct
propositions: (1) A violation of the Code is negligence per se.' (2) Violation is not negligence unless it is the proximate cause of the accident. (3) A
violation is not necessarily negligence but is at least evidence of negligence. 4
In addition, other cases held that the violation, although constituting negligence, must be the proximate cause of the accident in order to make a defendant liable.5
The uncertainty of the law on this question was doubtlessly intended to
be dispelled by the links decision.' In that case, defendant Currie attempted
* Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of the Thirty-fifth Judicial District (Mercer County);
A.B., Allegheny College, LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1324 Pa. 532, 188 Ati. 356 (1936).
2 Bohm v. Beckdol and Welker, 81 Pa. Super. 178 (1923);
Jamison v. Kamerer, 313 Pa.
1, 169 Atl. 231 (1933); Dempsey v. Cuneo Eastern Press Ink Co. of Pa., 318 Pa. 557, 179 Atl.
220 (1935).
3 Zandras v. Moffett, 286 Pa. 477, 133 Atl. 817 (1926); Johnson v. American Reduction Co.,
305 Pa. 537, 158 Atl. 153 (1931).
4Wilson v. Con. Dressed Beef Co., 295 Pa. 168, 145 AtI. 81 (1929); Hough v. American
Reduction Co. of Pittsburgh, 315 Pa. 234, 172 AtI. 722 (1934).
5
Stubbs v. Edwards, 260 Pa. 75, 103 Atl. 511 (1918); Mehler v. Doyle, 271 Pa. 492, 115
Atl. 797 (1922); Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 AtI. 88 (1925); Bloom v. Bailey, 292
Pa. 348, 141 Atl. 150 (1928); Gaupin v. Murphy, 295 Pa. 214, 145 Atl. 123 (1928).
6 See note 1, supra.
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to pass a truck just as the truck turned to the left to enter an intersection.
The lower court charged the jury that Currie's act in passing the truck at an
intersection was negligence per se and on appeal the Supreme Court held this
statement to be correct. It stated:
"The section of the act (forbidding passing at intersections) is a positive
mandate, a 'thou shalt not'. 'The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake and pass
any other vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, . . . at any intersection of
highways . . .' We are of opinion that the violation of such mandatory pro-

vision of the law, passed for the purpose of aiding the safe operation of motor
vehicles on the public highways, is negligence per se, and that the court was
right in so charging. It is true we have held the violation of an municipal ordinance is only evidence of negligence (Ubelmann v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa.
398, 400, 58 A. 839, 850; Weinschenk v. Phila. H. M. B. Co., 258 Pa. 98,
105, 101 A. 926, 929; Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204, 208, 104 A. 587, and other
cases) and while it is true we said by way of obiter dictum in Johnson v.
American Reduction Co., 305 Pa. 537, 539, 158 A. 153, 154, 'It is not negligence per se to ignore a statutory duty in driving a vehicle'; in the same sentence
we commented that the ignoring of the statute requiring the driver of a wagon
to keep close to the right curb was not the proximate cause of the accident in
that case. This principle of negligence per se was in mind when we decided
Lane v. Muller, Inc., 285 Pa. 161, 131 A. 718; Zandras v. Moffett, 286 Pa.
477, 133 A. 817; and Hayes v. Schomaker, 302 Pa. 72, 152 A. 827; and is
embodied in the general summary in the RESTATEMENT, TORTS, sec. 286, p.

752: The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act ..*
makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another.' The majority
rule is that the violation of a statute is negligence per se: 45 C. J. 720; 20
7
R. C. L. 38."

Since the decision in the links case, the Supreme and Superior Courts
have repeatedly stated the law to be that violation of a mandatory provision
of the Vehicle Code by a defendant is negligence per se.8
On the other hand, the Pennsylvania appellate courts have also continued
to state and apply the rule that violations of the Code do not constitute negligence unless the particular violation is the proximate cause of the accident.
For example, in the case of Knoble et ux v. Ritter,9 in which the defendant
drove his car to the top of a hill at a speed in excess of that allowed by the
statute and skidded on an icy stretch of highway into the plaintiff's car, the
7Id. at 537, 188 Atl. at 358.
8 Gaskill v. Melella, 144 Pa. Super. 78, 18 A. 2d 455 (1941); Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa.
393, 32 A. 2d 407 (1943); Landis v.Conestoga T. Co., 349 Pa. 97, 36 A. 2d 465 (1944);

Kropko v. Galida, 155 Pa. Super. 446, 38 A. 2d 491 (1944);

Marchl v. Bowling & Co. Inc.,

157 Pa. Super. 91, 41 A. 2d 427 (1944); Bricker v. Gardner, 355 Pa. 35, 48 A. 2d 209 (1946);
Com. v. Pennzoil Company, 358 Pa. 221, 56 A. 2d 93 (1948).
9Knoble et ux. v.Ritter, 145 Pa. Super. 149, 20 A. 2d 848 (1941).

1958.)

153

STATUTORY STANDARDS OF CARE IN PENNSYLVANIA

court approved the action of the lower court in submitting the question of the
defendant's control of his vehicle to the jury, but stated:
"It is true that . . . speed in excess of that permitted by statute will not
convict the driver of negligence unless it is shown that the speed was the proximate cause of the accident." 10

In the case of Huber et al v. Anderson" the defendant was
automobile on the left side of the street in violation of the Vehicle
the minor plaintiff coasted on a sled under the rear wheel of the
car. The court held that the fact that the driver was on the left
road was immaterial, quoting from earlier cases:

driving his
Code when
defendant's
side of the

"The fact that the driver was on the left side of the road, it may be observed, does not in itself establish negligence unless his position on that side
was the efficient cause of the collision." 12

In McClelland et ux v. Copeland' the court approved an instruction that:
"the mere fact that there were four people on the front seat of the truck
does not in itself constitute negligence as applied to the case before you."
In the case of Ennis v. Atkin,"4 a fire truck collided with the defendant's
truck while rounding a corner on its way to a fire, causing the plaintiff decedent to be thrown from the fire truck and killed. Defendant's truck was
parked within 15 feet of a fire hydrant in violation of the Vehicle Code.
The Supreme Court stated:
"Clearly the facts are insufficient to charge appelee with negligence per
se." 15

It must be agreed that these two lines of cases make it difficult to state
any broad general rule with respect to whether violation of a provision of the
Motor Vehicle Code by a defendant does or does not constitute negligence
on his part. Perhaps the language of the cases can be reconciled by a rule
reading as follows: "Violation of the code amounts to negligence if, but only
if, such violation is the proximate cause of the accident; but, where the
proximity of cause is clear, the violation constitutes negligence per se."
Fortunately, however, there are other cases which suggest a more satisfactory rule.
1Old. at 153, 20 A. 2d at 850.
1LHuber v. Anderson, 355 Pa. 247, 49 A. 2d 628 (1946).
12 Id. at 252, 49 A. 2d at 631.

13 McClelland v. Copeland, 355 Pa. 405, 50 A. 2d 221 (1947).
14Ennis v. Atkin, 354 Pa. 165, 47 A. 2d 217 (1946).
15 Id. at 169, 47 A. 2d at 219.
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In Ketzel v. Lizzini, " the plaintiff, Ketzel, was injured while riding as a
passenger in a car operated by defendant Lizzini, which collided with a car
operated by one Dembrowski, in a right angle collision. Dembrowski had
the right of way and was traveling at the rate of 40 miles per hour on a
through highway. In sustaining judgment n.o.v. in favor of Dembrowski, the
court said:
"Furthermore even if Dembrowski were exceeding the speed limit, his
speed would not amount to actionable negligence unless shown to be the proximate cause of the accident. Mulbeirn v. Brown, 322 Pa. 171." (Italics supplied)

.17

The use of the word "actionable" suggests that proximate cause is neces-

sary not to create negligence but to create liability for that negligence, as is
the case when the alleged negligent act is founded upon common law want
of due care.
In Shakely v. Lee,18 while the court was dealing with the question of
whether the plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence in passing a truck at an intersection in violation of the Vehicle Code, it said:
"Violation of a statute constituting negligence per se is nevertheless not
a ground of liability, nor does itsupport a charge of contributory negligence,

unless it is the proximate and efficient cause of an accident which is of the type
the legislative enactment was designed to prevent." (Italics supplied.)1,

Likewise, in Kowalsky's Express v. Haverford Twp.,2 ° where the defendant's driver admitted entering a through highway without stopping his truck,

the court said:
"A violation of the safety regulations of the Vehicle Code is negligence
per se (citing cases) and such negligence is a ground of liability if itis the
proximate and efficient cause of an accident which is of the type the legislative

enactment was designed to prevent." (Italics supplied.)

21

Also, in the case of DeLuca v. Manchester Laundry and Dry Cleaning,22
which involved injuries received by the plaintiff when struck by an automobile
operated by one defendant while walking around a truck of the defendant
laundry company which occupied the sidewalk and a portion of the street,
16 163 Pa. Super. 513, 63 A. 2d 369 (1949).
17 id. at 517, 63 A. 2d at 371.
18368 Pa. 476, 84 A. 2d 322 (1951).

"8 Id. at 478, 84 A. 2d at 323.
170 Pa. Super. 229, 85 A. 2d 884 (1952).
21ld. at 231, 85 A. 2d at 885.
22380 Pa. 484, 112 A. 2d 372 (1955).
20
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allegedly in violation of the parking provision of the Vehicle Code, the court
said:
"In the second place, even assuming, arguendo, that the Laundry Company was guilty of a violation of the provisions of the statute and therefore
negligent per se, such negligence was not a ground of liability unless it was
the Proximate and efficient cause of the accident in question: (citing cases) ."2
Further, the case of Huber v. Anderson,2 ' in which the Superior Court
stated that a violation of the Code did not constitute negligence unless it
was the efficient cause of the collision, relied upon two early cases, Stubbs v.
Edwards 25 and Wetherill v. Showell, Fryer and Co.,21 which merely held that
the conduct of the defendant did not create liability.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the applicable rule may be stated as
follows: A violation of the Code by a defendant constitutes negligence on his
part, but such violation does not make him liable to the plaintiff unless it was
the proximate cause of the accident. This rule not only summarizes the principles set forth in the Ketzel, Shakely, Kowalsky, and DeLuca cases, but it
simplifies and harmonizes the rules which deal with statutory standards of
care and those which concern the common law standard, so that, in both instances, negligence plus proximate cause equals liability.
II. CONTRIBUTORY'NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF
When it is the plaintiff who has violated a provision of the Vehicle Code,
the question whether such violation constitutes contributory negligence on his
part is also faced with two distinct lines of decisions.
In one group of cases, the courts have stated in unmistakable language
that such a violation is contributory negligence per se and bars a recovery.
For example, in Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co. et al,21 the widow of a
truck driver sued to recover damages for her husband's death which was
caused when he drove his vehicle over the top of a hill into another truck
which had collided with a third vehicle. The court held that the driver was
guilty of contributory negligence in violating section 1002 of the Vehicle
Id. at 488, 112 A. 2d at 374.
2 See note 11, supra.
25 260 Pa. 75, 103 Atl. 511 (1918).
Here a speeding car struck a motorcycle which darted
out in front of it. The court said that the violation of a statue does not create a liability unless
it is the efficient cause of the injury.
20 264 Pa. 449, 107 At!. 808 (1919).
In this case a boy was struck by an automobile while
coasting on a sled. The court did not say that the violation of a speed statute does not constitute
negligence unless it is the proximate cause of the acident. It merely held that there was po
liability.
23

27 318 Pa. 541, 179 Ati. 84 (1935).
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Code, which requires a driver to keep his vehicle under such control that he
can stop within the assured clear distance ahead. The court stated:
"The statute was passed to protect life and limb; decedent was bound to

guard, to the extent stated, against that and every other possibility, and the
statute must be construed and applied to further that purpose." 28
Similarly, in D'Ambrosio et al v. Philadelphia,9 a twelve year old boy
was thrown off the tailgate of a truck on which he was a trespasser in violation of the Vehicle Code and seriously injured. He brought a suit against
the defendant city for failing to keep its streets in repair. Holding that the
plaintiff's violation of the Code was contributory negligence per se, the court
stated:
"In the absence of the statute, the minor plaintiff's contributory negligence
would have been for the jury but the Legislature established a standard of
conduct for all persons which neither court nor jury may set aside in a case
within its terms." 30

It should be noted that in both of the above cases, the causal relation
between the plaintiff's violation of the Code and the accident was direct and
clear.
Where such causal relation is not clear, or is non-existent, is the plaintiff
still guilty of contributory negligence per se because he violates the Code?
In his opinion in the D'Ambrosio case, Mr. Justice Linn intimated that the

plaintiff would not be guilty, stating:
"It is, of course, true that not every violation of such statutes is proof
of negligence per se but as this is a clear case we need not discuss the general subject." "I

And the cases dealing squarely with the question have uniformly held

that a violation of the Code does not constitute contributory negligence where
the violation has no causal relation to the accident.
Thus, in Purol Inc. v. Great Eastern System, Inc.,32 in which the plaintiff
failed to place flares at the front and rear of his truck as the Code required,

the court (Keller, J.) stated:
"The general rule is that the violation of a statute will not convict a

plaintiff of contributory negligence unless it was the effective cause of the accident or at least contributed to its happening although there may be circum28

id. at 544, 179 AtI. at 86.

29

354 Pa. 403, 47 A. 2d 256 (1946).

30Id. at 405, 47 A. 2d at 258.
"I Id. at 407, 47 A. 2d at 259.
32 130 Pa. Super. 341, 197 AtI. 543 (1938).
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stances in connection with the mischief to be remedied by the statute or in the

enforcement of its provisions which require a ruling that an injury suffered in
connection with the violation of the statute will be attributed to such violation. " s

The opinion in the Purol case listed as examples, the faulty registering
of a motor vehicle,"4 the operation of a car by an unlicensed person," and the
failure to have his car equipped with legal lights."s
Other cases of like tenor include Hayes et ux v. Schomaker 7 where the
plaintiff cut a corner in making a left turn; Ross et al v. Reigelman 8 and
Balzer v. Reith et ux " in which the plaintiffs exceeded the speed limit of 15
miles per hour in a school zone; Vunak v. Walters," where the plaintiff
stopped his truck to repair it on the left side of a wide street; Steffenson v.
Lehigh Valley Transit Co.," in which the plaintiff stopped his car in front
of a street car without giving a hand signal, although the application of his
brakes automatically lighted a red tail light; and Salvitti v. Throppe," where
the lack of a view for 500 feet ahead had no connection with the accident.
There is, therefore, no question that mere violation of the Vehicle Code
by a plaintiff will not convict him of contributory negligence if the violation
is unrelated to the accident.
There is some uncertainty in the law, however, as to whether to constitute
contributory negligence, the violation must be a proximate cause of the accident, or whether it is enough if the violation merely contributes to the accident.
It will be remembered that in the Purol case, the court states that either
is sufficient. The language to that effect in the Purol case was quoted by the
court in Ross et al v. Reigelman, supra., and in Vunak v. Walters, supra.
In other cases, however, notably Hayes et ux v. Schomaker, supra., Collichio et ux v. Williamsj4 Shakely v. Lee," and Steffenson v. Lehigh Valley
Transit Company, supra., the court stated that violation of the Vehicle Code
will not prove contributory negligence unless it is the proximate cause of the
Id. at 343, 197 Atd. at 544.
34Williams v. D'Amico, 78 Pa. Super. 575 (1922).
35Yeager v. Winton Mo. Carr. Co., 53 Pa. Super. 202 (1913); Mcllhenny v. Baker, 63 Pa.
Super. 385 (1916); Hart v. Altoona & Logan Valley Elec. Ry. Co., 79 Pa. Super. 180 (1922);
Scorsoni v. Pittsburgh P. & P. Co., 272 Pa. 253, 116 At. 154 (1922).
36 Clamper v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 385, 124 At. 132 (1924).
37 302 Pa. 72, 152 At. 827 (1930).
38 141 Pa. Super. 293, 14 A. 2d 591 (1940).
3 161 Pa. Super. 182, 54 A. 2d 64 (1947).
40 157 Pa. Super. 660, 43 A. 2d 536 (1945).
41 361 Pa. 317, 64 A. 2d 785 (1949).
42 343 Pa. 642, 23 A. 2d 445 (1942).
43 311 Pa. 553, 166 Atl. 857 (1933).
4368 Pa. 476, 84 A. 2d 322 (1951).
33
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accident. There is a substantial difference. This is illustrated by the recent
companion cases of Crane v. Neal and Dean v. Neal.45
In those cases, the two plaintiffs stopped their motorcycles on the paved
portion of the highway to repair them. There they were struck by the defendant's car. The trial court charged the jury that they (the plaintiffs) would
be guilty of contributory negligence only if their act in so stopping on the
highway was the proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while violation of a statute does not support a charge
of contributory negligence unless it is the proximate and efficient cause of an
accident, in that case the defendant relied upon the common law principles
of contributory negligence (i. e., that a plaintiff is barred if his negligence
contributes in the slightest degree to his injury); that the jury could have
found the plaintiffs guilty of contributory negligence in parking their motor
vehicles so as to occupy and block all but one foot of their traffic lane, irrespective and independent of the provisions of the Vehicle Code; and that
the trial court should have so charged the jury.
It would appear, from the above, that it is now the law that the violation
of the Vehicle Code by a plaintiff must be a proximate cause of the accident,
and not merely contribute in some degree to the happening of it, if such violation is to constitute contributory negligence on his part. It will be noted that,
in this respect, a departure from the statutory standard of due care differs
from a departure from the common law standard where it is the plaintiff's
contributory negligence that is being considered.
To summarize. It is the general rule that violation of the Vehicle Code
by a plaintiff will constitute contributory negligence on his part if, but only if,
the violation is a proximate cause of the accident. Where, however, it is clear
that the violation is a proximate cause, the violation constitutes contributory
negligence per se and bars a recovery. And where the act of violation is of
such a nature that a jury could find it to be negligent at common law,.' independently of the Code, it will be contributory negligence and bar a recovery
if it contributes in the slightest degree to the happening of the accident.
45 389 Pa. 329, A. 2d (1957).
46 i.e., an act that an ordinary, reasonably prudent person would not do under the circumstances,

